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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate what decreases TFP, why TFP has decreased in 
some countries and how large the decreases of TFP are. We focus on the quality of labor 
and capital inputs and use cross country data for the manufacturing industries of some 
OECD countries. We provide a comprehensive empirical investigation based on two 
hypotheses, substitutability and complementarity of labor input age and skill categories. 
Further, we provide an aging index, which tells how much the share of ICT capital should 
be increased to counterbalance decreases of TFP caused by the aging of the labor input. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As empirically found by Lebow (1993), Sbordone (1996) and Basu and Fernand (2001), 
among others, the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) accounts for a large percent of growth 
within economies and behaves pro-cyclically in a business cycles. The TFP is often seen 
as the real driver of growth within an economy. Basu and Fernand (2001) provide four 
channels from the TFP to the business cycle which lead to pro-cyclical productivity: 
technology fluctuation that affect both productivity and output; increasing returns and 
imperfect competition that cause productivity to increase with an increase in inputs; 
variation of utilization rate of inputs over the business cycle; and reallocation of 
resources between sectors or firms with different productivities. In (at least some) of the 
channels the TFP changes are exogenous shocks for the business cycle.  
 The next logical step is to investigate what causes the TFP changes and why the 
TFP has decreased in some countries. Since Japan has experienced a long period of slow 
growth, it serves as a good example of attempts to explain the productivity slowdown. 
Hayashi and Prescott (2002) found that the low TFP accounts well for the Japanese lost 
decade of growth, and conjectured that the low TFP growth was the result of a policy that 
subsidized inefficient firms and declining industries. This policy resulted in lower TFP 
because the inefficient producers produce a greater share of the output. Though many 
other papers have mentioned the TFP decrease in the business slump, they have not 
investigated what decreased it. Exceptions are Nishimura et.al. (2005), who found that 
efficient firms in terms of TFP exited while inefficient ones survived, implying that the 
natural selection mechanism of economic Darwinism is not working properly. Further, 
this phenomenon is observed mainly for new entrants and contributes substantially to a 
fall in macro TFP after 1996. The work of Fukao, et.al (2005) is in the same strand. They 
focused on the aggregation aspect of the production function. Caballero et al. (2008) 
argue that bank credits to insolvent borrowers depressed job creation and destruction and 
led to lower productivity. Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005), Jorgenson and Nomura 
(2005), and Hayashi and Nomura (2005) mostly expand a single-sector growth model of 
Hayashi and Prescott to a multi-sector model, focusing on the relationships between 
information technology, labor input and the TFP through the price mechanism. They did 
not include the idiosyncratic characters like aging and skill levels directly into the 
physical inputs of labor and capital, and did not estimate the effect of each factor on the 
TFP. This alternative aspect is one of determinants for the TFP but has not been analyzed 
yet. The quality of labor as a determinant of productivity has been suggested in the micro 
context by Griliches (1967) and Hellerstein and Neumark (Hellerstein et al., 1999, 
Hellerstein and Neumark, 1999), among others. 
 The purpose of this paper is to investigate what decreases the TFP, why the TFP 
has decreased in some countries and how the TFP can decrease through aging. We focus 
on the quality of labor and capital inputs, and incorporate the aging of the physical labor 
input and the information technology component of the physical capital input in the 
framework used by Hellerstein et al. (1999) and Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2005). We 
then can identify the effect of each labor characteristic on the TFP, while we have no 
growth theory basis used by the previous researches. We also provide a comprehensive 
investigation based on two hypotheses of the relationship between workers of different 
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ages and skills, substitutability and complementarity, by using cross country data. This is 
different from the literature on worker characteristics and productivity, where perfect 
substitutability of labor categories is assumed and the analysis is conducted with single 
country micro data. We finally suggest a new measure, the Aging Index, to measure how 
much of the decrease of the TFP can be attributed to the aging of the labor input. We use 
cross country data for the manufacturing industries of some OECD countries.  
 We find that (i) Based on the perfect substitutability hypothesis among age groups, 
the low TFP is related to the aging of the labor input and to insufficient information 
technology content in the capital input. The aging of the labor input improves 
productivity only in the low skilled labor category, but contributes negatively to 
productivity in the medium to high skilled labor category. However, the total labor effect 
has still been positive in all of the countries examined. Due to the imbalances of the 
effects of aging and ICT (Information and Communication Technology), the TFP has 
since 1990 increased in Austria, Finland, Netherlands, and USA, while it has stagnated or 
decreased in Australia, Denmark, and Japan. (ii) Based on the complementarity 
hypothesis among the age groups, the increased share of the old workers has improved 
the productivity of the young and mid-aged workers in the low skilled labor category, 
while it has had no effect in the medium to high skilled group. The aging process has had 
positive effects in the low-skilled labor group in Japan and Finland, consistent with the 
results based on the perfect substitutability hypothesis. However, the test results for both 
hypotheses support the complementarity hypothesis in the low-skilled labor group and 
the perfect substitutability one in the medium to high skilled labor group, respectively. 
(iii) Both countries with a low value of the Aging Index (Finland and USA) and with a 
high value of the index (Austria, Netherland and UK) have successfully increased the 
share of the ICT to overcome the aging problem. Exceptions are Japan, Australia and 
Denmark. 
 With these findings we provide a new explanation of a low TFP, which differs 
from the previous viewpoints suggested in the literature. Moreover, we provide an 
empirical study of why the TFP has stagnated or increased in some countries, based on 
the idiosyncratic feature in aging labor and ICT imbalance. 
 This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we sketch the model. In Section 
3, we investigate what cause the low TFP, by using OECD panel data. In Section 4, we 
empirically investigate why TFP has decreased in some countries. In Section 5 we 
provide the analysis based on the complementarity hypothesis. In Section 6, we propose 
the Aging Index reflecting the aging of the labor input and using the index we investigate 
which countries are in a serious aging problem. Finally, in Section 7, we provide 
concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Production Function: quality adjusted labor and capital input  
 
We can formulate a Cobb–Douglas production function with capital and labor inputs: 
 
   LKtALAKY t )exp(0  (1) 
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Where the trend t  is allowed to vary over time and 0A  is constant over time. The TFP is 
defined as output unexplained by inputs, i.e., described as follows: 
 
 tALKYTFP t  )ln()ln()ln()ln()ln( 0  (2) 
 
The TFP change can be explained by the changing time trend t . However, this 
formulation cannot tell what kinds of economic factors affect the TFP change. In what 
follows, we investigate whether this kind of factors can be found in the characteristics of 
the labor and capital inputs. 
 The productivity varies by worker characteristics like age and skills. These can be 
included in the production function in several alternative ways. One alternative, which 
dates back at least to Griliches (1967) and has more recently been popularized by 
Hellerstein and Neumark (Hellerstein et al., 1999, Hellerstein and Neumark, 1999) is 
based on the shares of different types of employees.1 It starts from the assumption that 
different types of employees are perfect substitutes (we call this assumption 
“substitutability hypothesis”), but may have different marginal productivities. Using age 
groups among the low-skilled as an example, divide workers to two categories (e.g. 
young (y) and old (o)) with employment shares sly (=Lly/Ll) and slo (=Llo/Ll) where Ll is a 
total low-skilled labor input (hours or number of employees). The group y’s and o’s 
productivities equal to ly  and lo , respectively. Then, the total low-skilled labor input, 
considering the productivity difference, is llolollylyl LsLsL   . If we take group y as 
the base group, the relative productivity of group o is measured by a parameter 
lylolo  /ˆ   and 
  ))1ˆ(1()ˆ( lololyllololylyll sLssLL   .  (3) 
Here L is the quantity and ))1ˆ(1( lololy s  is the quality of low-skilled labor. The 
relative increase in productivity when we go from the reference group y to group o is 
denoted 1ˆ lo . The term ln( lL ) could be used as a variable in a logarithmic production 
function, but the model would have to be estimated using non-linear methods. The 
approach of Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2005), among others, is to simplify estimation by 
using first-order Taylor expansion around 0)1ˆ(  lolo s , 
   lolololo ss )1ˆ())1ˆ(1ln    (4) 
 
This gives the share of workers in a group directly as a variable in a log-form 
production function. The approximation is reasonable unless the relative productivity (of 
                                                 
1 Related work in the macro growth literature includes Lindh and Malmberg (1999) where GDP 
growth is explained by the shares of population age groups. The relationship between the quality 
of labor and the productivity can be analyzed also in other ways, for example using averages of 
worker characteristics (average age, average education years, etc.), as in Ilmakunnas, et.al. (2004). 
Some other forms in which human capital or more specifically education can be included in a 
production function has been discussed also in the growth literature (Temple, 2001).  
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the old in this example) is very high and at the same time the labor share is high. When 
the approximation (4) is used in a Cobb–Douglas production function  *LAKY  , the 
estimated model is described as follows, in the case of two work characteristics j (low-
skilled (l) and high (h) skilled workers) and three possible age groups n (=young (y), 
mid-aged (m), old(o)) 
 
hohohmhmlololmlmhhll ssssLLKY
****)ln()ln()ln()ln(    (5) 
 
where Ll and Lh are low-skill and high-skill labor inputs, respectively, 
)ln()ln()ln( hyhlylA   , )exp(0 tAA t , and )1ˆ(*  jnjjn  .  
 The productivity also varies by capital characteristics like vintage, the high-tech 
(e.g. information technology) content of the capital input, etc.. These characteristics can 
be included in the production function in several alternative ways, while it is very 
difficult to obtain the necessary data. The vintage capital was a main alternative for that, 
used by Mizon (1974), Malcomson and Prior (1979) and Mcintosh (1986), among others. 
However, the accounting value for capital based on the constant capital depreciation 
already reflects the vintage. There are also other problems. As pointed out by Caballero 
(1999), Cummins and Violante (2002), and Mukoyama (2008), the acceleration of 
investment-specific technological progress can distort the measurement of the aggregate 
capital stock. Accordingly, Mukoyama (2008) writes: 
 
“Many economists reported an acceleration of investment-specific technological progress in the 
late 1970s. In a recent paper, Cummins and Violante (2002) argued that during this period, 
investment-specific technological progress accelerated from an annual rate of 3% to 5%. Our 
analysis shows that this acceleration can cause a large change in the rate of replacement. As a 
result, with the conventional measurement of capital (the perpetual inventory method with 
constant depreciation), the aggregate capital stock is overestimated. This bias has an important 
consequence in measuring total factor productivity (TFP). In the usual growth accounting 
exercise, the growth rate of TFP is measured as output growth minus the contribution of the 
growth in capital and labor. When the existing amount of capital stock is overestimated, the 
contribution of capital accumulation is overstated. Therefore, the growth rate of TFP is 
underestimated.” (Mukyoma, 2008, p.514). 
 
Following this suggestion, we use for the capital input the same kind of 
formulation as was used for the labor input in (3), with ICT capital and other capital as 
different categories. Then, we can revise a Cobb–Douglas production function as 
 ** LAKY  , and the estimated model is in the case of 2 worker skill characteristics in 3 
age groups and 1 capital characteristic in 2 groups (Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT), and Non-IC Technology (NICT))  
 
0
****
*
)ln()ln(
)ln()ln(




hohohmhmlololmlmhhll
ICTICT
ssssLL
qKY
 (6) 
where )ln()ln()ln())exp(ln( 0 hyhlylNICTt tA   and NICT is the 
productivity for NICT, )1(*  ICTICT   and KKq ICTICT / . We have also added an 
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error term to account for stochastic shocks and left-out variables. If the production 
function (6) is true, the TFP defined in (2) can be expressed as: 
 
 
0
*****
0 )ln()ln()ln()ln(
)ln()ln()ln()ln()ln(






hohohmhmlololmlmICTICT
thyhlylNICT
hhll
ssssq
tA
LLKYTFP
 (7) 
 
TFP can now be explained by the quality of labor (age/skill group shares) and quality of 
capital (ICT capital share), and the time effect tt . The time effect has no economic 
meaning, while it is a proxy for the other economic variables except for the quality of the 
labor and the capital. In practice we will model the time effect with year dummy 
variables. 
 To calculate the TFP, we proceed as follows. First, by using (6), we estimate the 
parameters of the production function and by checking the significance of the estimated 
parameters we investigate what affects the TFP and why the TFP has decreased in some 
countries. In addition, by using (7), we investigate how much the manufacturing TFP 
change is correlated with manufacturing value added growth country by country. Second, 
we provide an alternative production function based on the complementarity hypothesis 
of labor age categories, thereby relaxing the perfect substitutability assumption used in 
(6). 
 
 
3. Influential economic factors on TFP 
 
Cross-country data 
 
In the cross-country analysis we use data that are from the EU-KLEMS data base.2 Since 
we are interested in the characteristics of the labor and capital input, we include countries 
for which the division of the labor input to different age/skill-combinations and 
information on ICT capital are available. Further, we require that the data are available 
for a long time period. With these restrictions we end up with data on the aggregate 
manufacturing of the following eight OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Japan, Netherland, UK and USA.3 Some of the data are available for the period 
                                                 
2  EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts: March 2008 Release, available at 
www.euklems.net. 
3 In addition to these countries, both the labor input file (which includes the information on 
age/skill shares) and the capital input file (which has information on ICT capital) were at the time 
of writing this paper available for Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Korea, and Slovenia. We 
dropped Czech Republic and Slovenia because of the short time periods (from 1995 only), 
Germany because of the break caused by German unification, and Italy because the skill shares 
deviate so much from the other countries and show very little variation over time that the 
classifications are most likely different. In addition, since Korea has experienced a quite drastic 
growth, the time series cannot be regarded as representative of the whole period. When we 
include Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Korea, and Slovenia in the analysis, the main 
conclusions are similar but some results are not significant. 
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1970-2005, but because of missing information on labor characteristics or ICT the period 
is shorter for most of the countries.4 
 
We measure output with the volume index of value added, labor input with total hours 
worked, and capital input with real fixed capital stock. All of these variables are 
measured in real terms, and since country differences in levels can be accounted for by 
country dummy variables, we need not convert the variables to common currency. The 
labor characteristics are measured by the shares in total hours worked of the following 
age/skill-combinations: there are three skill types, low-skilled (35% of labor hours in the 
pooled data), medium-skilled (56%) and high-skilled (9%), and within each skill category 
the employees are divided to the young (15-29 year olds), mid-aged (30-49 year olds), 
and old (50 years and over). Since the share of high-skilled category is minor, we unify 
medium-skilled and high-skilled and create a new category, called ‘medhigh-skilled’ 
(65%). There are hence two skill characteristics divided to three age groups.5 That is, 
their shares are lms  for the mid-aged and los  for the old-aged among the low-skilled and 
hms  for the mid-aged and hos  for the old among the medhigh-skilled in eq. (6). The 
reference groups are the young low-skilled and young medhigh-skilled. As to capital 
input, we use information on the share of ICT capital in the total capital stock as the 
capital input characteristic. ICT includes computing equipment, communications 
equipment, and software. There is therefore one capital characteristic divided to two 
groups (i.e., ICT and NICT) in eq. (6) where the share of ICT is ICTq . 
 
Production function estimation and analysis of what affects the TFP 
 
Table 1 shows the estimated production function for the country panel on manufacturing 
by using (6). To allow for technological differences, we let the coefficient of the ICT 
share vary by country, using Japan as the reference country.6  
 First, we estimate the production function by including country and year dummy 
variables as follows:  
 
CYYYYCCC
hohohmhmlololmlmCICTCCICTICT
CYhhCYllCYCY
YDCD
ssssCDqq
LLKY






*****
)ln()ln()ln()ln(
 (8) 
 
                                                 
4  The data periods by country are the following: Australia 1982-2005, Austria 1980-2005, 
Denmark 1980-2005, Finland 1970-2005, Japan 1973-2005, Netherlands 1979-2005, UK 1970-
2005, and USA 1970-2005. 
5 In the EU-KLEMS project these data have been used for adjusting the labor input in growth 
accounting, assuming that labor compensation corresponds to productivity. In contrast to this, we 
use the information on the labor characteristics to estimate their relative productivities. 
6  We can allow for heterogeneity across countries by using different kinds of labor input 
categories, while we cannot do the same as easily with capital data. Therefore we interact the ICT 
share with country dummies to account better for capital-related heterogeneity. 
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where )ln()ln()ln()ln( 0 hyhlylNICTA   , CD and YD are country and year 
dummy variables and suffixes Y and C are from year 1971 to 2005 and from country 2 to 
8, respectively. We also estimate the production function excluding the year dummy 
variables YD from (8). As shown in column (a) and (b) of Table 1, the estimated 
coefficients show that both production functions with and without year dummy variables 
are homogeneous with degree one, 01  hl  . 7  Re-estimation with this 
constraint may be necessary, but in the present paper we do not impose it. Also, those 
countries with clearly insignificant coefficients for the ICT share may be combined to the 
reference group. However, we leave these variables in the equation for the TFP 
estimation. 
 We use the specification without year dummies in column (b) as our basic model. 
The coefficients of physical inputs are all significantly positive in column (b). In the 
labor groups we use young as the reference group. In the low-skilled category, in (b), the 
mid-aged are equally productive to the young because of the insignificant coefficient but 
the old are more productive by loˆ  = (1+0.598/0.092) = 7.5 times8. In the medhigh-skilled 
category the mid-aged are more productive than the young by (1+0.472/0.498) = 1.95 
times but the old and young are equally productive. These results can be interpreted to 
show that in low-skilled jobs the greater physical strength of the young workers is not 
enough to compensate their lack of experience, whereas in medhigh-skilled jobs the more 
recent education of the young and mid-aged compensates for the lack of experience. As a 
result, among the medhigh-skilled, the mid-aged are the most productive. 
 The coefficients of the age categories are illustrated in Figure 1. These figures 
show an U-shape for the low-skilled and an inverted U,  -shape, for the medhigh-skilled 
labor. The shape of the age-productivity profile in the medhigh skill category is 
consistent with some “stylized facts” of the development of productivity by age. The bars 
next to the productivity coefficients indicate the average (over countries and over time) 
share of the category in question. Each share multiplied by the productivity coefficient is 
close to zero, which supports the linear approximation shown in (4).  
The coefficients of the ICT share show big variations across countries. The 
estimation results show that ICT has been more productive in the reference group country 
Japan than NICT by (1+4.953/0.508) = 10.75 times (significant at 10% level), whereas 
the ICT productivity is lowest in Denmark by (1+(4.953-5.924)/0.508) = -0.91 times and 
in Australia by (1+(4.953-4.913)/0.508) = 1.08 times. 9 For the other countries (Austria, 
Finland, Netherland, UK, USA), the coefficients of the country-specific ICT shares are 
insignificant at the 10% level. We can conclude that their coefficients are the same as that 
of Japan, with ICT capital more productive than NICT capital. Some of the ICT 
coefficients are too large to be quite plausible in the simple model above. It could be that 
the assumption of perfect substitutability of the capital categories is not tenable, or our 
approximation for the logarithmic form is not particularly good. Therefore, we should 
                                                 
7  We can allow for heterogeneity across countries by using different kinds of labor input 
categories, while we cannot do the same as easily with capital data. Therefore we interact the ICT 
share with country dummies to account better for capital-related heterogeneity. 
8 598.0)1ˆ(  lollo  , since 092.01  . 
9 971.0924.5953.4  Clo  and therefore 91.0598.0/971.01ˆ lo . 
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pay more attention to the relative magnitudes of the coefficients, rather than on their 
absolute values. 
 We do a robustness check of the results by including the year dummy variables 
(which play the role of proxy variables for the other economic variables). The results are 
shown in column (a) of Table 1. The sign of the old medhigh-skilled coefficient is 
changed from negative to positive, while it is not significant. The coefficient of the mid-
aged low-skilled stays negative, but is now significant. Also, similar changes happen for 
capital characteristics, while the order of ICT productivity among countries is not 
significantly changed. Second, while we include 35 year dummy variables, the adjusted 
R-squared increases only by 0.01. Finally, the shapes of the age-productivity profiles for 
the low-skilled and the medhigh-skilled labor categories are roughly similar to our basic 
results. Thus, the results seem robust to including the other economic variables (proxied 
by the year dummies).  
 
Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 
 
 The TFP is estimated as: 
  
 
CYCCC
hohohmhmlololmlmCICTCCICTICT
CYhhCYllCYCYCY
CD
ssssCDqq
LLKYTFP






*****
))ln()ln()ln(()ln()ln(
 (9) 
 
where the parameters are replaced by the estimates from column (b) of Table 1. The first 
row in (9) shows the estimated TFP. The second row and Table 1 show that the positive 
influential economic factors are the share of the old low-skilled worker hours and the 
share of mid-aged medhigh-skilled worker hours, whose coefficients are significantly 
positive, i.e., they are more productive than young workers in the same skill categories. 
Also, the share of ICT in all countries is a positive (or at least non-negative) factor on the 
TFP increases except for Denmark. The estimated TFP is shown in Figure 2 (change) and 
Figure 3 (level). In Figure 3 the values of ln(TFP) and ln(Y), are rescaled to be zero in 
1990.  
 
Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 
 
Business cycles and TFP 
 
The same way as some papers including Lebow (1993), Sbordone (1996) and Basu 
(2000), we investigate the cyclicality the TFP by visual inspection of the estimated TFP 
change and by calculating the correlation of ln(TFP) and value added ln(Y) changes. We 
define TFP to be pro-cyclical if the correlation is above 0.5. The graphs in Figure 2 for all 
countries show pro-cyclicality and the correlation with ln(Y) change is at least 0.5 for all 
the countries with maximum 0.91 for Japan and minimum 0.50 for Australia, as shown in 
Table 2. On the other hand, we report in Table 2 also the average of the ratio (absolute 
value of TFP growth)/(absolute value of input growth) for each country. The input 
growth is calculated as CYhhCYllCY LLK )ln()ln()ln(   . The figures in Table 2 show 
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that a large portion of the manufacturing value added growth can be explained by the 
TFP growth, i.e., the TFP is a main driver of growth. 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
 
4. Why has some countries’ TFP decreased? 
 
 The main results in Table 1 in the context of the aging trend and ICT imbalance 
are as follows. The aging trend in a labor skill category means a decrease in the shares of 
young and mid-aged workers (and their hours of work). Among the low-skilled labor this 
negative aging trend increases the share of the more productive old workers, implying a 
positive productivity effect. On the other hand, the aging trend in the midhigh-skilled 
labor group decreases the share of the more productivity mid-aged workers with a 
negative productivity effect. The aging trends can be counteracted by investments in ICT. 
The ICT capital is more productive than the NICT except for Denmark, while the 
productivity is different depending on the country. 
 The TFP for each country is explained by the estimated coefficients for equation 
(9) (Table 1, column (b)) and the share variables of each country. Based on the estimation 
result, we check the age shares country by country (Figures 4a to 4c) and consider why 
the TFP of Japan, and Australia, Denmark and UK has recently slowed down or that of 
Austria, and Finland, Netherlands and USA has increased, as shown in Figure 3. As seen 
in Figure 4a and 4c, the USA has no aging trend in either labor skill group in the sense 
that there is no increase in the share of the old workers’ hours. The recent aging since 
1990 among the medhigh-skilled labor (seen in Figure4c; Japan, Australia, Denmark, 
Finland, Netherlands, UK) has caused a reduction of the most productive mid-aged 
workers in some countries (Japan, Australia, Finland, as seen in Figure4b), while its 
effect has not been strong enough to decrease the share of mid-aged workers in Denmark, 
Netherland and UK. On the other hand, the aging of the low-skilled labor has increased 
the most productive old workers in some countries (Japan, Finland, Netherlands, and UK 
as can be seen in Figure 4a).  
 The total labor effect, obtained by summing all effects 
hohohmhmlololmlm ssss
****    in (9), is still positive (see Table 3) and increasing over 
time for all countries (see Figure 4e). In addition to these effects of aging, ICT has had an 
effect, CICTCCICTICT CDqq  *  on TFP in (9). In most cases the total labor effect 
dominates the ICT effect (column 4 of Table 3). The ICT effect is increasing over time in 
some countries, but relatively flat in others (Figure 4e). 10 The slow growth of ICT in 
Japan (as shown in Figure 4d) has contributed to the stagnating TFP (the share of the ICT 
effect is relatively low), whereas for example in Finland the fast ICT growth has 
contributed to the larger share of the ICT effect.  
 
Insert Figures 4a,b,c,d,e and Table 3 
                                                 
10 Note that in Figure 4e we have scaled the graphs so that they are zero in 1990. Therefore the 
levels of the lines should not be compared. 
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 Thus, in a wake of the aging trend, some countries lose the productive workers 
(i.e., the mid-aged workers in the medhigh-skilled category), while immigrant countries 
like USA are able to appropriately adjust the shares of the young and mid-aged workers 
in each skilled category over time. Also, in a wake of information technology trend with 
higher productivity, the countries like Finland using the technology efficiently have 
obtained a high TFP.  
 
 
5. Complementarity among labor groups 
 
We already found the contributions of the composition of labor and ICT effects on TFP 
in Table 3. A large portion of the TFP can be explained by the labor effect. Next we 
examine in detail the complementarity between different age groups. To simplify the 
analysis, we reduce the number of groups by using a new age group “y-worker” which 
means the young and the mid-aged workers combined. We hence have two age groups, y-
workers and old workers, divided to low-skilled and medhigh-skilled ones. The increase 
in the share of the old within the skill groups then shows the aging trend. Related to 
equation (3), we assume that the y-workers’ productivity is complemented by the old 
workers. Previously we have assumed perfect substitutability of the age groups. In that 
case the relative productivity of the young is independent of the share of the old. 
Departing from that assumption we now assume that the y-workers’ relative productivity 
)(ˆ jojy s  depends on the share sjo of the old workers in each skill category j. This 
relationship is represented by a decreasing or an increasing function around 1jos , as 
shown in Figure 5. An increasing function shows complementarity between the age 
groups, whereas a decreasing function would imply (imperfect) substitutability of the age 
groups. This relationship can be interpreted as a particular character of team work 
(discussed e.g. by Benders and Hootegem, 2000, in the context of Japanese working 
place). On the other hand, many papers are dealing with the capital - skilled labor 
complementarity (e.g. Yasar and Morrison Paul, 2008), while there are few papers 
studying the complementarity of the old workers and young workers. We add a further 
assumption about the shape of the complementarity function: 1)(ˆ jojy s  at 1jos  even 
though the function may be increasing or decreasing. The y-worker’s productivity 
increases or decreases depending on the share of the old workers and finally the 
productivities are equal. 
 
Insert Figures 5 
 
Consider the case of low-skilled workers (j=l). We express the function )(ˆ loly s  as a first-
order Taylor expansion around 1los :11 
                                                 
11 We can relax the assumption as follows: 1)1(ˆ ly  when 0lyA  and 1)1(ˆ ly  when 
0lyA . The former means that the old improve the young’s productivity, and the latter is the 
 12
 1)1(ˆ)1()1(ˆ)(ˆ  lylolylyloly wheresAs   (10) 
 
Equation (4), productivity, for young low-skill workers can be expressed, by using (10): 
 
 2)s1()1)1s()1(ˆ(s1)-)(sˆ(s)X(s lolylolylylylolylylo AA    (11) 
 
This formulation satisfies also the approximation in (4). This introduces an interaction 
term of the shares of the y-workers and old workers, but since we have only two age 
groups, this implies a quadratic form in the share of old workers. We estimate the TFP by 
inserting this approximation (11) into equation (9).  
 
The coefficients are related to the shape of the productivity of low-skilled labor in (11), 
due to the first order and the second order conditions: 
 
 lylolololylolo AA 2)/dsX(sd,)s-(12)/dsdX(s
22   (12) 
 
This productivity X is a convex function decreasing from a positive value to zero with the 
increase of los when lyA <0, which means that the productivity of y-workers is decreasing 
in the share of old workers as seen in Figure 5. On the other hand, it is a concave function 
increasing from a negative value to zero when lyA > 0, which means the productivity of y-
workers is increasing. In particular, lyA = 0 means X = 0, which means that the 
productivity of y-workers is equal to that of the old workers. Note that we are not trying 
to find a point where the share of old workers maximizes total productivity. For example, 
if the function )(lˆy los  is quadratic, we would end up with X being a third-order 
polynomial. This could have a (local or global) maximum at some value of slo between 
zero and one. Instead, we analyze the shape of the function (and X), and thereby the 
complementarity or substitutability at large values of the share of old workers. 
 The results are shown in Table 312. The productivity X is significantly concave in 
the low-skilled labor category (the coefficient of (1-slo)2 implies lyA =0.354) and zero 
(insignificant) in the medhigh-skilled labor group (the coefficient of (1-sho)2 implies 
hyA =0.178). Considering these characteristics and the first order condition in (12), we 
can find the location of each country by using the average shares of slo and sho. We show 
in Figure 6 the cases of Japan and USA, which have the highest and lowest share of old 
                                                                                                                                                 
opposite case. Note that we assume that 1)1(ˆ ly is appropriately small in order not to affect 
the )1s( lolyA  in (11). Then, we can know whether X is increasing or decreasing, depending on 
the sign of lyA : )1)1(ˆ)(1()s1(
2  lylololy sAX  . 
12 Note that in (8) the coefficients of labor characteristics should not be very negative, since 
)1ˆ(  jnjjn   and the relative productivity jnˆ  is not negative. In contrast, in the 
complementarity formulation the parameters are slopes of a function and can be large in absolute 
value. 
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low-skilled labor, respectively, among the countries in our data. Moreover, considering 
the increase of the share of old workers in both skill groups in Japan (see Figures 4a and 
4c), the aging trend implies moving towards the right hand side in Figure 6, which 
increases the productivity of low-skilled labor and stagnates it in the medhigh-skilled 
labor group. On the other hand, the USA has no aging trend and therefore no change in 
the labor productivity over time. Similar facts hold in the other countries.13  
 These results are not inconsistent with the results based on the hypothesis of 
perfect substitution. We can reconcile the findings as follows. As shown in Figure 5, the 
result that lyA  > 0 in the low-skilled labor group means that an increase in the old 
worker’s share improves the productivity of y-workers. Further, the result lyA  = 0 in the 
medhigh-skilled labor group means no improvement of their productivity, but they have 
the same productivity as the old workers. These results can be interpreted to show that in 
low skilled jobs a large number of the old workers can easily transmit their experience to 
the young workers (i.e., the age groups are complements), whereas in medhigh-skilled 
jobs the more recent education of the young brings the same productivity as that of the 
old and the old cannot improve the young with their experience (i.e., the age groups are 
perfect substitutes). Thus, this is the same interpretation as what we drew form our earlier 
results.14  
 The column (a) in Table 4 shows the robustness check with including the year 
dummies. Our main implications remain the same. The main difference to column (b) in 
Table 4 is that some of the coefficients of the ICT shares change, but even then their 
relative orders of magnitude do not change much. 
 
Insert Table 4 and Figures 6 
 
 
6. The Aging Index 
 
The ICT effect and the total labor effect on the TFP have positive trends over time as 
shown in Figure 4e. However, as the aging proceeds more, the labor effect may slow 
down, as evidenced by Japan. The labor effect is but moderated by the ICT progress. In 
fact, a country with high progress of the ICT needs not pay attentions on aging. How do 
we recognize the seriousness for the aging labor problem on the TFP for each country? 
Focusing on the moderating effect of ICT progress and using (9), the following change of 
the ICT share is needed to make the TFP equal to random shocks 
YCYCYCY TFPTFPTFP  1)ln()ln()ln( : 
                                                 
13 Again, we should not give too much emphasis on the absolute values of the ICT coefficients. 
The ICT coefficient for Denmark in column (b) of Table 4 is 1+(5.070-6.759)/0.591 = 1-
(1.689)/0.591 = -1.86, which is significant. This negative coefficient (negative relative 
productivity) is somewhat a problem. The ICT coefficients for Australia and UK are significantly 
negative, while the second one plus ICT coefficient is positive and moreover, the first one plus 
ICT coefficient is insignificant by t-test.  
14 However, the results are not exactly comparable, since in the complementarity analysis we 
have aggregated the young and the mid-aged workers (with more productivity than the young) to 
the y-workers. 
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*, YhohoYhmhmYloloYlmlm
ICT
YICT ssssq    (13) 
 
where the subscript Y refers to years. Here, the numerator in (13) is change in the term 
that we have already defined as ‘total labor effect on the TFP’ in Section 4. YICTq ,  is the 
change of the ICT share which is necessary to stop the TFP decrease (or increase) caused 
by the change in the total labor effect. Since the ICT productivity parameter *ICT  and the 
changes of the labor input shares ( YhoYhmYloYlm ssss ,,,, ,,,  ) vary across countries, the 
term YICTq ,  in (13) reflects the idiosyncratic index for the necessary increase of ICT 
share in each country. Considering the coefficients in Table 1, for example, the index for 
Finland for 2005 is )658.1953.4/()0165.0(,  YICTq  = 0.0025 percentage points, 
where -0.0165 percentage points decrease is the total labor effect on the TFP and 
4.953+1.658 is the productivity parameter of the ICT. This value of the index means that 
0.0025 percentage points increase of YICTq ,  is needed to stop the TFP decrease caused 
by the aging effect of labor. Also, for Japan the index for 2005 is 
953.4/)0347.0(,  YICTq  = 0.0007 percentage points, which means that a larger 
increase of the ICT share is needed in Finland. This is because the total labor effect is 
negative in Finland. In this sense, we call this index is an Aging Index of the country. A 
country with ICT share change at least equal to the index is meeting the aging problem.  
 By using the Aging Index, we investigate which countries are in a serious aging 
problem and when. As shown in Figure 7, the aging index of countries with high 
productivity of ICT, like Austria, Finland, Japan, Netherlands and USA, is generally 
smaller than for the other countries. Also, the index of each country is larger in the recent 
years due to aging-caused changes in the total labor effect. In order to overcome this 
aging problem, most of the countries have been able to increase the actual share of the 
ICT as shown in Figure 7 and as a result, most of the countries have been able to increase 
the TFP as shown in Figure 3. Exceptions are Australia and Denmark, which have low 
ICT productivity (negative productivity coefficients). In those countries an increase of 
ICT share means a decrease of the TFP. Another exception is Japan with the stagnated 
TFP, where the actual increase of ICT share has been higher than the required increase of 
ICT share (Aging Index), but still relatively low.15 
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
  
The purpose of this paper was to investigate what decreases the TFP and why it has 
decreased in some countries, focusing on the quality of labor and capital inputs. We did 
this by using cross country data for the manufacturing industries of some OECD 
countries.  
                                                 
15 Note that the scales of the panels in Figure 7 vary by country. 
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 We found that (i) the low TFP is related to the aging of the labor input and to 
insufficient information technology content in the capital input. The aging of the labor 
input improves the productivity only in the low skilled labor category, but leads to a fall 
in productivity in the medium to high skilled labor group. The productivity impact of ICT 
capital varies from country to country. Due to these positive and negative effects of aging 
and ICT imbalance, the TFP has since 1990 increased in Austria, Finland, Netherland, 
and USA, while it has stagnated or decreased in Australia, Denmark, and Japan. In 
particular, the decrease or stagnation of the TFP initiated by aging is not a problem in an 
immigrant country like USA, which is able to adjust to the problem by immigration.  (ii) 
Based on the complementarity hypothesis, increased share of the old workers in the low 
skilled labor group improves the young and mid-aged low-skilled workers’ productivity. 
On the other hand, increased share of old medium to high-skilled workers has no effect 
on the young and mid-aged workers in this skill group. An interpretation of the results is 
that the aging of the low-skilled labor improves the productivity of the younger workers 
through the old workers’ experience, but in the higher skilled groups the better education 
of the young dominates, so no complementarity is found between the age groups. These 
results add to the recent results dealing with the complementarity of capital and skilled 
labor. (iii) We have calculated the change in ICT which is necessary to compensate for 
the aging of the labor input and called this the Aging Index. Both countries with a low 
value of the aging index (Finland and USA) and with a high value of the index (Austria, 
Netherland and UK) have successfully increased the share of the ICT to overcome the 
aging problem. Japan, Australia and Denmark are exceptions.16 
 With these findings we provide a new explanation of a low TFP, which differs 
from the previous viewpoints suggested by Hayashi and Prescott (2002), Jorgenson and 
Motohashi (2005) and Hayashi and Nomura (2005). 
                                                 
16 The change of the total labor effect for Australia fluctuates between positive and negative 
values, while the size of ICT coefficient is very small compared with the other countries, 0.040 (= 
4.953 - 4.913) as shown in Table 1. As a result, even small changes in the age effect require large 
changes in ICT (see Figure 7). The ICT is therefore not effective for stopping the problem of 
aging labor. 
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Table 1. Estimated coefficients of production with country panel data: 
Substitutability hypothesis 
 Dependent variable ln(value added)  
 Including year 
dummies (a) 
Excluding year 
dummies (b) 
ln(Ll) : l 
 
ln(Lh): h 
 
ln(K) :  
 
 
Young low-skilled 
Mid-aged low-skilled  lm  
Old low-skilled            lo  
 
Young medhigh-skilled 
Mid-aged medhigh-skilled hm  
Old medhigh-skilled           ho  
 
 
Non-ICT 
ICT 
 
ICT Australia 
 
ICT_Austria 
 
ICT Denmark 
 
ICT_Finland 
 
ICT Netherlands 
 
ICT UK 
 
ICT_USA 
 
 
Number of significant country 
dummies (of 7) 
 
Number of significant year 
dummies (of 35) 
0.276* 
(5.27) 
 0.467* 
(4.79) 
0.325* 
(3.19) 
 
Ref. 
-0.477* 
(-2.60) 
0.647* 
(3.21) 
Ref. 
0.650* 
(3.51) 
0.636 
(1.61) 
 
Ref. 
-1.623 
(-0.46) 
0.296 
(0.09) 
5.627# 
(1.83) 
-0.712 
(-0.23) 
5.076* 
(1.97) 
3.267 
(1.14) 
1.366 
(0.45) 
4.702 
(1.47) 
 
 
6* 
 
 
20* 
 
0.092* 
(3.11) 
0.498* 
(6.58) 
0.508* 
(5.53) 
 
Ref. 
-0.252 
(-1.22) 
0.598* 
(2.64) 
Ref. 
0.472* 
(2.26) 
-0.602 
(-1.48) 
 
Ref, 
4.953# 
(1.69) 
-4.913# 
(-1.77) 
0.357 
(0.13) 
-5.924*  
(-2.11) 
1.658 
(0.69) 
-1.254 
(-0.47) 
-4.187 
(-1.54) 
-0.910 
(-0.33) 
 
 
6* 
H0: +l+h–1 = 0.;t-value 
Adjusted-R2 
Observations 
0.69 
0.96 
244 
1.29 
0.95 
244 
Notes:  t-values in parentheses. * denotes 5% significance, # 10% significance. ‘Ref.' indicates the base 
group. The non-reported constant terms are significant in both columns. 
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Table 2: Correlations and ratios between value added, input and TFP growth rates  
Country Correlations Ratios 
(a) year 
dummies 
(b) no year 
dummies
(a) year 
dummies
(b) no year 
dummies
AUS 0.39 0.50 1.60 2.77
AUT 0.87 0.90 3.60 16.01
DNK 0.80 0.85 5.80 6.19
FIN 0.70 0.74 9.60 10.78
JPN 0.89 0.91 5.04 3.01
NDL 0.41 0.69 5.12 2.68
UK 0.59 0.64 44.70 1.63
USA 0.77 0.84 7.45 10.38
Notes: Correlations denote the correlations between TFP growth and GDP growth, and ratios denote the 
average of the ratios (absolute value of TFP growth)/(absolute value of input growth) over time. 
 
Table 3: Composition of labor effect and ICT effect in the TFP 
 (a) year dummies (b) no year dummies 
labor ICT labor ICT 
AUS 1.36 -0.36 0.98 0.02 
AUT 0.81 0.19 0.64 0.36 
DNK 1.32 -0.32 0.50 0.50 
FIN 0.80 0.20 0.59 0.41 
JPN 1.08 -0.08 0.74 0.26 
NDL 0.81 0.19 0.49 0.51 
UK 0.21 0.79 -0.04 1.04 
USA 0.71 0.29 0.56 0.44 
Notes: The composition of labor effect is defined as: 
)/( ********* CICTCCICTICThohohmhmlololmlmhohohmhmlololmlm CDqqssssssss  
The ICT effect is 1- the composition of labor effect.
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Table 4. Estimated coefficients of production with country panel data: 
Complementarity hypothesis 
 Dependent variable ln(value added)  
 Including year 
dummies (a) 
Excluding year 
dummies (b) 
ln(Ll) 
 
ln(Lh) 
 
ln(K) 
 
 
Y-worker low-skilled (1-Slo)2:-Aly 
 
Y-worker medhigh-skilled (1-Sho)2: -Ahy
 
 
 
Non-ICT 
ICT 
 
ICT Australia 
 
ICT_Austria 
 
ICT Denmark 
 
ICT_Finland 
 
ICT Netherlands 
 
ICT UK 
 
ICT_USA 
 
 
Number of significant country dummies 
(of 7) 
 
Number of significant year dummies  
(of 35) 
0.052* 
(4.45) 
 0.478* 
(4.95) 
0.444* 
(4.36) 
 
-0.631* 
(-5.55) 
-0.210 
(-1.25) 
 
 
Ref. 
1.081 
(0.32) 
-2.879 
(0.98) 
2.170 
(0.77) 
-4.033 
(-1.41) 
2.847 
(1.18) 
0.270 
(0.10) 
-1.707 
(-0.61) 
2.147 
(0.71) 
 
 
6* 
 
 
12* 
0.088* 
(3.03) 
0.437* 
(5.78) 
0.591* 
(6.47) 
 
-0.354* 
(-2.87) 
-0.178 
(-0.94) 
 
 
Ref 
5.070* 
(2.41) 
-5.459* 
(-2.81) 
-0.004 
(-0.00) 
-6.759* 
(-3.46) 
1.189 
(0.66) 
-1.477 
(-0.78) 
-4.568* 
(-2.37) 
-1.147 
(-0.56) 
 
 
6* 
H0: +l+h–1=0; t-value 
Adjusted-R2 
Observations 
1.54 
0.97 
244 
1.47 
0.95 
244 
Notes: see note of Table 1. The non-reported constant term is significant in both columns.  
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Figure 1: Relative productivities of age groups by skill 
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Figure 2: Growth rates of manufacturing value added and TFP by country 
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Figure 3: Levels of manufacturing value added and TFP by country (1990=0). 
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Figure 4a: Share of old low-skilled labor input by country 
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Figure 4b: Share of mid-aged medhigh-skilled labor input by country 
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Figure 4c: Share of old medhigh-skilled labor input by country 
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Figure 4d: Share of ICT capital by country 
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Figure 4e: Total labor effect and ICT effect by country (1990=0). 
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Figure 5: Complementary between y-workers (young and mid-aged) and old 
workers 
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Figure 6: Complementarity of labor in each skill category 
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Figure 7: Aging Index  
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